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1. On the necessary connection test 
Two innocent truisms about the law lie behind much of the difficulty we have in 
understanding the relations between law and morality. The law can be valuable, but it 
can also be the source1 of much evil. Not everyone agrees to these truisms, and there is 
nothing inappropriate in challenging them, or examining their credentials. They are, 
however, truisms in being taken by most people to be obviously true and beyond 
question. In other words, they express many people's direct reactions to or understanding 
of the phenomena, an understanding which is open to theoretical challenge, but has to be 
taken as correct absent a successful theoretical challenge 
There is no conflict between the truisms. People and much else in the world can be the 
source of both good and evil. Trouble begins when we ask ourselves whether it is entirely 
contingent whether the law is the source of good or ill in various societies, or how much 
good and how much evil there is in it. There has, of course, been enthusiastic and 
persisting support for claiming that the connection between law and morality is not 
contingent. The support comes from contradictory directions. Some strands in political 
anarchism claim that it is of the essence of law to have features which render it 
inconsistent with morality. Hence the law is essentially immoral.2 A clear example of this 
in recent times has been Robert Paul Wolff's argument that the law in its nature requires 
obedience regardless of one's judgement about the merit of the obeying conduct, and that 
this is inconsistent with people's moral autonomy which requires them to take 
responsibility for their actions and to act only on their own judgement on the merit of 
                                                 
1  I say that the law can be the source of much evil, meaning that the evil is brought about by human 
beings, but that the law often plays a causal role in bring it about, in facilitating its occurrence. 
2  This normally means that ‘legal authorities’ do not have moral authority, and the law they make 
and enforce is not morally binding on us, at least not as it claims to bind.  (See the Appendix for a 
discussion of the claims of the law.) this allows that the law can also be a source of good in ways 
which fall short of possessing authority. 
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their actions.1 Diametrically opposed to this variant of anarchism is, e.g., a variety of 
Thomist natural law views which regard the law as good in its very nature.2  
Both sides of this particular dispute admit that the law can do some good (even according 
to the anarchists), and that it can be the source of evil (even according to the Thomists). 
Anarchists can admit that some laws are sensible. They can admit that their directives can 
create valuable options not otherwise available, and that people ought to conform to 
them, so long as they do not do so because they were ordered, so long as they conform 
only where in their judgement, they should perform the legally required act, regardless of 
the fact that they have a legal duty to perform it, and of course, so long as the law is not 
coercively enforced. Thomists can admit that the law can be corrupted and put to evil use 
by governements, or by some of their officials. All they need insist on is that such 
aberrations are exactly that, namely aberrations, not to be confused with the normal 
 2
 lawyers, 
                                                
case.3  
Some of my observations will bear on these views4, but my aim is to focus first on a 
preliminary question: should we, as is common, make the question 'is there a necessary 
connection between law and morality?' a litmus test for the basic orientation of different 
theories of law? It is common to call those who show negative in the test, including John 
Austin, Jeremy Bentham, Hans Kelsen, and H.L.A. Hart, legal positivists, and to regard 
Thomas Aquinas, Michael Moore, Philip Soper, and Ronald Dworkin as natural
for no other reason than that they show positive when the litmus test is applied.  
Arguably there is no harm in any classification. Any similarity and any difference can be 
the basis of a classification, and most classifications would do no greater harm than being 
boring because they would be insignificant. The harm is done by proceeding to make the 
division between 'legal positivists' and 'natural lawyers', so defined, the basic division in 
legal philosophy. For there can be no doubt that there are, necessary connections between 
 
1  See Robert Paul Wolff, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHY. I offered one reply to this argument in 
THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM chapter three, and will not consider it any further here. 
2  For a modern version see John Finnis, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (Oxford: 
OUP 1980) especailly Chapters One, and Ten. 
3  See Finnis, Op. Cit. . A similar view is held by a number of other non-Thomist contemporary legal 
philosophers. See, e.g., Dworkin, LAW'S EMPIRE. 
4  Which I have discussed at greater length elsewhere: 
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ood, is a relatively trivial thesis, which lends no credence to what is of interest in 
ess we ask the right questions about that relations 
He
rotection for life and 
nd the law 
an manifest 
to their highest degree all the virtues or all the vices there are. 
       
law and morality. This makes it appear as if ‘legal positivism’ is mistaken, that is as if 
any ‘legal positivist’ theory is false, and every natural law theory, even if mistaken on 
some isses recognises the truth of a deep and contentious thesis.  And of course it follows 
that all the theories which deny any necessary connection between law and morality 
include at least one false proposition. However, as it happens it does not show that they 
contain more than one false proposition, because the theories concerned do not build on 
their mistaken denial of a necessary connection, and all their main theses about the nature 
of law remain intact. Correspondingly, the truth shared by all natural law theoreis, so 
underst
them.  
This shows that the question of a necessary connection is a bad litmus test. Rather than 
offering a useful key to the typology of legal theories it leads to confusion. To be sure, 
clarifying the relations between law and morality is rightly seen as central to the 
explanation of the nature of law. But unl
we will not reach illuminating answers. 
re are three examples of necessary connections between law and morality: 
 (Following Hart1, but without trying to be faithful to the details of his 
argument): given human nature and the conditions of human life 
(especially mutual vulnerability and relative scarcity), necessarily no legal 
system can be stable unless it provides some p
property to some of the people to whom it applies. 
 Given that only living animals can have sex, necessarily rape cannot be 
committed by the law nor by legal institutions (though they a
can sanction it, and legal institutions can be accomplices to it). 
 Given value pluralism2, necessarily no state or legal system c
                                          
1  
2  
human being, and relying on the fact that the realisation of various incompatible values and 
THE CONCEPT OF LAW pp 193ff. 
Defined as the existence of a plurality of values which cannot be instantiated in the life of any 
single 
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 The first of these is a natural necessity. The other two can claim to be conceptual, a 
priori necessities. Either way they are necessary connections, for natural necissities, that 
is those which exist because of basic features of the world, e.g., because it is governed by 
the natural laws which do in fact govern it, are sufficiently secure to merit the attention of 
the theory of law, assuming that they are not trivial in nature. The three necessities 
enumerated suggest ways of generating many more true statements about necessary 
connections between law and morality (the law cannot be in love, and therefore cannot 
have the virtues of true love, etc.).  Though many of them are of little interest. But 
regardless of what interest they hold, they show that the existence of necessary 
connections between law and morality cannot really be doubted, at least that it should not 
be doubted, and that it has little bearing on important issues which may divide writers 
like those I mentioned above. 
2. On the necessary obligation to obey  
Some writers claim, of course that there are other types of necessary connections between 
law and morality, which have greater significance to an understanding of their relations. 
Here are a few examples of such claimed or alleged necessary connections which appear 
to be of a kind, to belong together: 
Necessarily, everyone has a duty to obey the law of his country. 
Necessarily, everyone has a reason to obey the law of his country. 
Necessarily, if the law is just all its subjects have a duty to obey it, (or, alternatively, a 
reason to obey it).. 
Necessarily, if the government of a country is democratic all its subjects have a duty to 
obey its law (or, alternatively, a reason to obey its law). 
Necessarily, one has an obligation to support just legal systems. 
 4
                                                                                                                                                 
r virtues requires supportive societal conditions (see my THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, chapte
14). 
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every promise creates a moral duty, so one has a moral 
uty we mean only that the obligation to act in the required way 
Clearly, these claimed necessary connections show, if true, something important about 
the relations of law and morality. This is, perhaps, most clearly seen in (1).1 Some people 
regard it as the real divide between so called natural lawyers and so-called legal 
positivists. However, there are natural lawyers who do not uphold it, and in any case (as 
will be briefly observed below) it does not  follow from the basic assumptions of Thomist 
natural law. (1) claims that the law is a source of moral duties in the way in which one 
often thinks of promises as a source of moral duties2: just as one has a moral duty to do 
what one promises, and therefore 
duty to do what the law demands of one, and every law imposing another legal duty 
imposes or creates a moral duty.  
This does not mean that (1) claims that any legal duty adds to the number of things one 
has a moral duty to do. Just as one may promise to act as one morally ought to act in any 
case, so the law may impose a legal, and therefore a moral, duty to do what one ought to 
do, or has a moral duty to do, anyway. In saying that every new law creating a legal duty 
creates a new moral d
acquires a new ground, one which will remain in force even if the others do not exist, or 
if they cease to exist.3 
On this view the law is part of morality just as promising is part of morality. It is natural 
for those who doubt the soundness of such a view to think that the main objection to it is 
that it underestimates the ability of the law to do evil, and to be immoral. After all if law 
                                                 
1  The difference between (1) and (2) relates to the nature and stringency of the moral requirement 
the law creates. I will make nothing of this difference and my references to (1) should be read as 
references to either (1) or (2). 
2  Moral duties (as well as reasons, values, etc.) do not in general have sources. They can be 
explained, and it is possible to establish what duties people have. But their explanations, and 
justifications, or grounds are not ‘sources’. Promisory and legal duties are among the few types of 
obligations which have sources, i.e. the acts of making promises and laws. 
3  Even that is not strictly necessary. It is possible for the moral standing of a law to be conditional 
on its content being morally required anyway. Compare this case with, for example, a child being 
told by his parents to obey his minder if at lunch time he tells him to have his lunch. We can 
imagine that the child should have his lunch anyway (would have had ample reason to have it had 
he been left alone), and that implicitly the parents intimate that the minder need not be obeyed if 
he instruct the child to do something the child has no reason to do anyway. Still the minder's 
instructions to the child are binding on him and we understand that (and would understand similar 
laws) as meaning that they reinforce the reason or obligation the child has anyway. Once 
instructed not doing what one ought is a wrong in an additional way, for an additional reason. 
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marginal cases of being a state. Similarly, with the law, 
t no single example can be a decisive counter-example. Any 
                                                
is part of morality, how can it be immoral or do evil? I suspect, however, that on its own 
this objection lacks force. There are two ways consistent with a general obligation to 
obey all law, in which the law can fall short of moral ideals, and they allow for the 
possibility of considerable evil perpetrated by law.  
First, we must allow that any account of the nature of law will apply to central cases, and 
will allow for degenerate cases of law. To give a related example, there are states like the 
Vatican, which do not display some of the central characteristics of states, and yet it 
would be pointless to debate whether they are states or not, or to take them as counter-
examples disproving the correctness of otherwise sound characterisations of states. We 
simply acknowledge them as 
there can be legal systems which are so regarded conventionally, yet which are 
exceptional, or degenerate cases of legal systems. It would be a mistake to deny that they 
are legal systems, but also a mistake to take them as disproving otherwise sound 
characterisations of the law.1  
I do not mean to say tha
characterisation which will fail to apply to the law of France, or of the United States, for 
example, will be defective just in virtue of this fact (though still possibly better than all 
known alternatives). But some legal systems can reasonably be taken to be marginal or 
degenerate cases of law.2 
John Finnis and Dworkin3, both espousers of a general obligation to obey all law, 
emphasised the possibility of marginal cases of law to which the duty does not apply. 
There is, however, yet another way in which the law of a country may do evil even if 
there is a general duty to obey all its laws. That way is open to those who support the 
 
1  For a brief explanation of the theoretical character of accounts of concepts like that of the law in 
MORALITY OF FREEDOM chapter 3 (regarding the concept of authority), and in ‘Two Views of 
the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial Comparison’ HART’S POSTSCRIPT ed. By J. 
Coleman (OUP 2001).  
2  I am assuming, what some people find problematic, that vague concepts can have essential 
properties. This is possible so long as those properties admit of vagueness, or if they apply, or can 
apply to a greater or lesser degree, and their vagueness or degree of application are among the 
factors which make the concept to which they belong vague. 
3  In NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, 1980, chapter 1, and in LAW'S EMPIRE, 
respectively 
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al properties of legal systems as a whole, which justify 
operties. But it 
d of how much injustice and oppression, etc., it may cause. It is unlikely that 
                                                
duty to obey by content-independent moral reasons. These are reasons which depend not 
on the claim that each and every one of the laws of all legal systems is morally 
meritorious in a way which imposes a duty of obedience on all its subjects, rather they 
depend on general virtues, and mor
a duty to obey each of their laws, just because they are laws of that system. If that is the 
foundation of the general obligation to obey then it is compatible with considerable moral 
failings. It is compatible with many of the laws of the system, and many of its institutions 
being morally defective, or worse. 
This is a point of general importance, which I will return to later in the article. The law as 
a whole can have moral properties because its, or the majority of its, components, 
especially its laws or rules, have them. These are its aggregate moral pr
also has, what I will call, systemic properties, properties which belong to the law, or legal 
system as a whole but not in virtue of being aggregates of the properties of its component 
parts.1 The necessary moral properties of the law as a whole may be systemic, allowing 
for a good deal of shortcoming in the moral merit of its individual norms. 
The fact that the general duty to obey may depend on systemic features of the law does 
not, of course, show that it is compatible with a proper conception of how evil the law 
can be, an
the systemic moral qualities of the law are entirely independent of, entirely unaffected by, 
the moral qualities of the content of the law, that is of the moral content of the laws 
which constitute it. How are we, then, to assess the claim that there is a general obligation 
to obey? 
 
1  One needs a more precise way of marking the distinction between systemic and aggregate 
properties. One could define emergent properties as simply properties of the whole which are not 
properties of any of its parts. In this sense being wise is a property of a human being, which is not 
a property of any part of a human being (except metaphorically), though it may be a function of 
those properties . The distinction I am after is different. It is meant to exclude properties of the 
whole which are 'simple' mathematical functions of the properties of the parts, properties which it 
is tempting to say are mere mode of representing properties of the parts. I have in mind properties 
of a whole which, e.g., it possesses simply because there is a property which either all, or a 
threshold number, or proportion, of its parts have, or because it is the average or the mean of the 
properties of the parts. These may differ from proper systemic properties only in degree, only in 
the indirectness or complexity of their dependence on properties of the parts. But the difference 
matters.  
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sarily involved with the law are institutions 
od as a quest for its systemic moral 
Versions of it has been expressed in recent time 
cto political power and legal control has legitimate power. For, 
                                                
The issue turns, naturally enough, on what are the main essential systemic features of the 
law, and especially what are its essential systemic moral properties. The commonly 
accepted answer is that they have to do with the institutionalisd character of the law, and 
its reliance on the use of force. I will follow this line of thought, and will consider the 
law's use of force to be but an aspect of the kind of institution it is, i.e. as an aspect of its 
institutional character.1 The institutions neces
of adjudication and law enforcement. In most societies they also include law-making 
institutions, that is those with power to make perfectly general laws, and not only, as do 
institutions whose power is limited to adjudicative and law enforcing funcitions, 
particular laws or legally binding directives.  
The case for the moral character of the law, understo
properties, rather than for the moral properties of each and all its binding standards, is the 
moral case for having legal authorities, of the law-making and law applying varieties. 
There is such a case. It is a Thomist case. 
by various writers.2 Broadly speaking, it goes thus:  
First, human life goes better when subjected to governance by (conscientious) authority. 
There is, in other words, a job to be done, a task to be discharged, a need for authority to 
regulate interactions in human societies.  
Second, whoever is in a position to discharge that job has the moral authority to do so. 
That is, whoever has de fa
on the one hand, only those with de facto political power and legal control can perform 
the job. Only they can meet the moral need for  human societies to be governed by 
authority. And, on the other hand, possession of de facto power is sufficient to make them 
able to perform that job.  
 
1  Those who put the emphasise more on the use of force by the law sometimes refer to its 
monopolisation of the use of force. But that, read simply, is false. Law can be and usually is 
consistent with a good deal of 'private' use of force, i..e. use of force by people and organisations 
other than law-enforcing ones.  
2  Anscombe, “On the Sources of the Authority of the State”, COLLECTED PAPERS, VOL. III, 
ETHICS, RELIGION AND POLITICS (Oxford: Blackwells 1981). It is also adopted by Tony 
Honore in  . A more specific and detailed argument of the same family is advanced by Finnis in 
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, chapters 5 and 10.  My rendering of the argument 
above differs in some respect from that of those writers, but shares their basic approach. 
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, can be derived. But its conclusion can easily be 
The argument has the right shape, it does not rely on the alleged moral quality of each 
and every law. Rather, it acknowledges that bad, including morally bad laws can be laws. 
The argument relies on the systemic moral qualities of the law, from which an obligation 
to obey laws, including bad ones
exaggerated. It cannot be used to establish that those who have de facto power and legal 
control have legitimate authority, a right to the power and legal control that they possess, 
which is what has to be established to vindicate a general obligation to obey the law in 
any country, as is asserted by (1).  
Any obligation to obey the law that it can establish but be doubly qualified. First, since it 
derives the authority of the state or the government from the fact that it can fulfil a job 
which needs doing, that authority must be limited to a government which discharges the 
job successfully. The authority of the government is cannot derive from its ability to 
discharge the needed job rather it must depend on success (or the likelihood of success) 
in doing so. Second, while the legitimacy of the government which derives from its 
ably, this does not cover the regulation of 
tain conditions which may meet the success condition. 
success (actual or likely) in performing a job which needs doing must be confined to its 
actions aimed at discharging this job. The argument cannot endow governments with a 
general authority, an authority to do whatever they see fit, as it must if it is to vindicate a 
general obligation to obey as in (1).  
Let us say for the sake of argument that governments have power to keep the peace, 
enforce a fair system of property and contractual rights, and make sure that no one suffers 
(non-voluntrily) from serious deprivation. Argu
the consumption of tobaco or its advertising (those who do not eat in smoke filled 
restaurants will avoid them, etc.) It would follow that governments which do regulate the 
consumption and advertising of tobacco exceed their authority, and there is no obligation 
to obey the laws they make without authority. 
Once we subject the criteria of legitimacy to a success condition (to accommodate the 
first qualification), and a relevance to the needed job condition (to accommodate the 
second) only those who make a reasonable success of the morally sanctioned task of 
government, or stand a reasonable chance of succeeding in it, enjoy legitimate authority. 
Propositions (3) and (4) above con
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function reasonably well even when their population is critical and alert, and will 
A just state and a democratic state is a state which succeeds in at least some of its tasks. 
The justice condition may meet at least some aspects of the concern expressed in the 
relevance condition. Arguably a state cannot be just if it exceeds  its proper jurisdiction, 
if it strays into areas not its own.  
These matters have been much written about, and cannot be resolved here. I will mention 
briefly, however, that there are two familiar rejoinders to the line of reasoning pursued 
thus far. One claims that it has gone too far, that there is no need for the success and 
relevance conditions, while the other claims that the justice or democracy conditions are 
not sufficient to establish success and relevance and therefore not sufficient to establish 
even a qualified obligation to obey the law. The first rejoinder is based on the thought 
that any conditions on the authority of states or governments will undermine, if generally 
believed and acted on, their ability to discharge the task which justifies their existence. 
This is essentially an empirical argument, and I see no reason to give it general credence. 
Possibly this danger exists in some special situations, but there is no reason to think that 
it exists always. I say that partly because of some anecdotal knowledge that governments 
can 
withdraw recognition from measures thought to be unjust or anti-democratic, and partly 
because there is, as will be mentioned below, a separate duty to uphold and support just 
institutions, which, if generally believed, will obviate the danger this first rejoinder relies 
on. 
The second rejoinder, that the conditions of the government being just or democratic do 
not suffice to establish an obligation to obey, is more plausible. The problem is that being 
just, or being democratic, when they are systemic properties of the law, are consistent 
with individual laws being unjust, or pointless, or opressive. The question is: Is there an 
obligation to obey such a law, for if there is not there is no obligation to obey the law 
generally. One answer, and obviously there are many others, which I will just have to 
ignore here, is that that is necessary to support a just institution, a just government and 
legal system. This is again an empirical question, and I believe that there is plenty of 
evidence that the better argument is different. Just governments and legal systems 
generally speaking work better with less than perfect compliance. This statement should 
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tices, and less friction with resisting populations. Besides, though here one's sense of 
and that it 
pletely (i.e. have no legitimate 
authority at all) or partially (i.e. have some legitimate authority, but less than they claim 
ill not yield conclusions pointing to moral properties of every single legal 
itself in order to establish what attitude to the law as an institution they require. An 
                                                
not be misread. I do not mean that a few murders are better than none. I mean that there 
are many laws regarding which occasional breach by their subjects, and the occasional 
turning of a blind eye by the authorities make them achieve their goals with fewer 
injus
justice may cloud one's impressionistic empirical judgement, a population ready to defy 
pointless, unjust and opressive laws does more to preserve the just character of 
governements and their laws than a docile population willing to eat whatever it is dished 
out. 
A proper doctrine of authority should be based on the task to be done argument, qualified 
by the success and relevance conditions. Adequately formulating these conditions is no 
easy matter.1 What appears clear is that they set a test which is far from trivial 
is not be that difficult to find goverments which fail it com
to have). This means that there is no chance that the ‘general obligation to obey’, or ‘a 
general obligation to obey just or democratic legal systems’ theses are correct.  
3. Systemic moral properties of the law 
There is a general mistake undermining theses (1) to (4), a mistake which it is not too 
difficult to spot: they attempt to derive a moral property which applies equally to each 
and every law from systemic moral propeties of the law as a whole, or of some kinds of 
legal systems. Admittedly, there is no general reason to think that premises about the 
systemic moral properties of the law, perhaps afforced by appropriate moral or other 
premises w
norm. Some trivial conclusions come readily to mind (for example, the law of every just 
legal system has the moral property of belonging to a just legal system). But without 
additional premises, which I cannot see, no signifcant conclusions like (1) to (4) seem 
possible.  
Perphaps a more promising route is to explore the systemic moral properties of the law 
 
1  I made my suggestion in THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, chapter 3. 
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omist type of explanation of authority helps here too. 
g practice (i.e. that it is a valuable moral practice) 
, and one which 
d l  egal-
logy with 
orality. 
ms (among others): 
                                                
analogy with promises may guide us. The similarities between promising and the law are 
considerable. Both are ways of creating obligations by acts intended to do so – a fact 
often regarded as so mysterious that it has led to most ingenious writings attempting to 
explain away the mystery.1 The Th
There is a good which binding promises can serve or achieve, and that is why they can be 
binding. That is, the practice of promising is a morally valuable practice because it is one 
which can achieve valuable goals.  
It does not follow that all promises bind.2 Promises given by incompetent agents (say 
young children, or incapacitated people) are not binding3, nor are promises given under 
duress, or those in which the promisee undertakes to perform morally impermissible acts, 
and there are many others. Just as in the case of the law, we cannot infer from the 
systemic property of the promisin
specific obligations to perform all promises. But needless to say, the very proposition that 
the practice of promising is a morally valuable practice asserts a necessary connection 
between promising and morality.   
Is not the same true of the law? There are values that it can serve, there is therefore value 
in the law as a general institution. It is a morally valuable institution, just as promising is 
a morally valuable practice. That law is a morally valuable institution is part of its nature. 
There is a moral property, being morally valuable, which all law has by its very nature. 
So here we have another necessary connection between law and morality
is of the kind writers in the Thomist tradition assert, and those in the so calle
positivist tradition deny. So much for the argument which uses an ana
promising to establish a necessary connection between law and m
What are we to make of it? We should distinguish three clai
 
1  Often, as in the recent case of Scanlon's WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (Harvard 
University Press 1998), by explaining away the fact that promising is a way of creating obligations 
by intending to do so. But see the effective criticism of his views by Liam Murphy, and by David 
Owens . 
2  In other words, the argument has to be hedged with qualitifications when applied to promises, just 
as when applied to the law. 
3  Though promises made to and by children are important in teaching children about promises, and 
therefore often treated as binding in a sort of pretend, educational way. 
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ed for moral ends, seems 
bility of a morally laudable use for the law. 
 to be radically immoral, will demur. But moderate 
l systems can be radically evil. Nor does it imply anything 
that are unique to the 
Law, by its nature, is an institution which can be used to realise valuable ends. 
Law, by its nature, is an institution with a moral task to perform. 
Law, by its nature, is a morally valuable institution. 
The first, claiming no more than that the law can be us
unexceptional. Just about anything can be used for moral ends. Even Nazi gas chambers 
can be so used. They can be used, I imagine, even though perhaps not very efficiently, to 
kill some dangerous vermin.  
The second claim, that law by its nature has a moral task, seems both true and more 
interesting. It does more than indicate a possi
It postulates that some specific (though possibly abstractly conceived) moral task is 
central to the law, essential to it being the type of institution it is. It is important to note 
what this claim does not imply. 
First, it does not imply that it is morally or otherwise preferable to be governed by law 
than not to be subject to law, not even that it is preferable to be governed by a just legal 
system. Many anarchists, for example, who believe that it is much better not to be subject 
to law could agree to the claim that by its nature law has a moral task. Some anarchists, 
those who take any legal system
anarchists who hold that it is better to be governed by other means than through the law 
may agree that if one is subject to law, that is governed by a legal system, that law has a 
moral task. 
Second, it does not imply anything about the moral character of any actually existing 
legal system. It allows that lega
regarding the likelihood that any legal system will be just or unjust, good or evil. It 
merely claims that there is a specific moral test by which (among other tests) any legal 
system should be judged.  
Third, the claim does not imply that nothing but the law can have that task. It does not 
say that it is unique to the law. I doubt that there are important tasks 
law, in the sense that they cannot at all be achieved any other way. 
 





Fourth, the claim does not imply that the law may not legitimately aim to achieve other 
aims than the specific moral task inherent in its nature. 
The claim that law has, by its nature, a specific moral task, is nevertheless an importan
claim, as it sets the way in which we should think about the law. It sets a critical 
perspective for judging it. Just as we do not fully understand what chairs are without 
knowing that they are meant to sit on, and judged (inter alia) by how well they serve that 
function so, the claim is, we do not fully understand what law is unless we understand 
that it has a certain task, and is to be judged (inter alia) by how well it performs it. 
While endorsing the thought that there are essential tasks the law is burdened with I have 
been so far shy of identifying any. This essay is meant primarily to be about the basic 
way of conceiving the connection between law and morality. In this regard identifying 
the possibility or likelihood that one such connection is that the law has moral tasks is all 
that is required. The specific identification of the tasks can be left to a more extended and 
substantial discussion in political philosophy. For what it is worth, however, let me state, 
rather briefly and dogmatically, what task I can see for the law. It arises out of the law
character as a structure of authority, that is a structured, co-ordinated system of 
authorities. Authorities are legitimate only if they facilitate conformity with reason. The 
law’s task, put abstractly, is to secure a situation whereby moral goals which, given the 
current social situation in the country whose law it is, would be unlikely to be achieved 
without it, and whose achievement by the law is not counter-productive, are realised.  
 If the law has an essential task, does it follow that it is by its nature an essentially 
valuable institution (as per (3) above)? The analogy with promises would suggest so. 
But the analogy is flawed.  
There are, among others, two important differences between promises and the law, 
differences which bear on the way we conceive of their relations to morality. First, 
promises are made voluntarily (if binding)1 by a promisor, and accepted, or not rejected 
                                                 
1  Volunatriliness is a matter of degree. Promises are binding only if voluntary in the sense of not 
being coerced or manipulated out of the promisor with the intention to make him promise. They 
need not be voluntary in being undertakings he has no choice but to make in order to survive, etc. 
Hobbes was right about that. 
 





n, as a kind of 
ctice, can be put to moral use, and that, where it exists, it has moral 
tasks to discharge, so that it is to be judged, among other ways, by its success in 
by the promisee. They bind the promisor and no one else. The law could not be more 
different. Typically it is binding on people who did not make it, and had little influence 
on its content (even in a democracy, if only because the law binds succe
as well as those who voted against it). It is as if rather than binding himself the promisor 
were to impose obligations on the promisee who would be bound by them regardless of 
his agreement. That is why the law typically does, whereas promises do not, rely on 
coercion to improve the chances of compliance. Second, the law is not a promise, or a set 
of discrete promises, but a whole normative system, a system of interelating norms with a 
network of institutions in charge of their modification and application.  
The first point makes it reasonable to think that the law is more prone to abuse, to 
injustice and immorality than promises. But it is the second difference between them 
which is crucial. When we say that promising is a morally valuable institution (or 
practice) we are judging the abstract institution, not the way it is put into practice in one 
country or another. Perhaps in some countries most promises are of d
We imply nothing about that, nothing about the actual use made of promising, in saying 
that promising is morally valuable. Not so when we say that the law is a valuable moral 
institution. ‘The law is …’ is, in most contexts, short for the law of the country of which 
we speak. ‘The law requires me to pay income tax’ is not a statement about the abstract 
institution, but about UK law. When we do not refer to the law of a specific country we 
normally refer to the law of all countries, or of all countries today, etc.  
Therefore, ‘the law is a moral instititution’ means something quite different from 
‘promising is a moral institution’. The latter refers to an abstract moral institution, the 
former to the way it is actually implemented in history. But that is not a claim which can 
be warranted. While we can affirm that the law, as an abstract institutio
complex social pra
discharging them, we cannot say that in its historical manifestations through the ages it 
has always, or generally, been a morally valuable institution, and we can certainly not say 
that it has necessarily been so. To say that is to claim that by its very nature the law 
cannot be realised except in a morally valuable way. And that is not so. 
 
J. Raz, About Morality and the nature of law 
 
 16
On the one hand, I argued that 
ority, that it is in the business 
grouping is necessary. Perhaps humans need not live in societies organsied as they are 
       
4. Conclusion 
My rumindations so far did not yield very definite results. 
the denial of necessary connections between law and morality cannot be sustained. On 
the other hand, I contended that many of the claims of specific necessary connections 
between law and morality made by legal theorists are mistaken. My suggestion was that 
while there are necessary connections between morality and how the law is, the more 
significant necessary connections relate to the evaluative perspective which informs our 
thinking of how the law ought to be, rather than how it is.  
It may be thought that the thesis that by its nature the law ought to be moral is empty or 
trivial, for everyone and everything ought to be moral. But that is not so. To be sure, 
nothing should be immoral. But it is not the case that the University of Oxford, or the city 
of Oxford, ought to be moral in the way that the law is. The intrinsic virtue of a 
university, i.e. what makes a university into a good university, is excellence in learning, 
research and teaching. The intrinsic excel lence of a city may be comfort, and the 
provision of certain services. What makes the law different, what makes its intrinsic 
excellence a moral excellence, is that it is a sturcture of auth
of telling people what they must do. Necessarily, the law claims to have legitimate moral 
authority over its subjects.1 Hence its intrinsic virtue is to have such authority. To say 
that is to say that its virtue is to be moral but in a special way, in meeting the conditions 
of legitimacy. Like cities and universities it too can excel in other ways, including in 
other moral ways. The possession of moral legitimacy is only its intrinsic excellence, the 
one it must have, not the only one it may, or ideally should have. 
Let me instance one other important virtue the law may possess, in order to help bring out 
the difference between it, and other possible excellences of the law, and the possession of 
legitimate authority. People, Aristotle reminded us, are social animals. People can 
prosper and enjoy a rich and fulfilled life only within human society, and that requires the 
existence of social groups, communities, of a variety of kinds. Perhaps no specific kind of 
                                          
1  on of this] [To criticise Soper’s rejecti
 





 statements as being along 
rms or aspects of personal 
ng, and are none the worse for it. And so on. All 
we can say is that the law can be a valuable constituent component of valuable social 
groups, and if it is it has moral merit in being a worthy object of indentification and 
respect. But we cannot say that it must be such a constituent component, or that it fails if 
it does not. On the other hand all law must enjoy legitimate authority, or it fails in 
meeting its inherent claim to authority. 
                                                
today, with the familiar nation-states, and small heterosexual families. But a variety of 
types of social groupings, some larger and some more intimate, are needed to provide the 
background for fulfilled human lives. Let us accept such vague
the right lines.1 It can be claimed that the law is a constitutive element of some valuable 
forms of society, in today’s world of a national society, which is valuable for human 
prosperity. It can be further claimed that identification with the societies one belongs to is 
needed to make one prosper by being part of them. Does it follow that, therefore, people 
should identify with the law, holding it in respect and esteem? 
Not quite, for we are moving from necessary conditons for fo
prosperity to a conclusion taking them to be sufficient to require identification and 
respect. Still, it does follow from the very vague suggestion I articulated that the law, and 
society generally, could be worthy objects of indentificaction and respect. If they are then 
identifying with them would be worth while. It is an additional virtue in a good legal 
system that it is a worthy object of indentification and respect. 
These are, as I said, very vague suggestions, but there is something to them. Generally, 
talk of ‘the law’, as in ‘the law is a constitutive element of some valuable social 
groupings’, refers to one or some or all of actual legal systems. And they may be immoral 
and unjust, lacking in legitimacy, and they may be a constitutive element of an inherently 
immoral grouping, rather than of a valuable one. We are here in the hands of human 
history, and no virtue is guaranteed. Morover, it is not necessary for valuable social forms 
that they be constituted by law. There are national groups which do not form nation 
states, and enjoy no special legal standi
 
1  In THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, chapter 12 I tried to sketch some familiar ideas which 
explain the above truisms. 
